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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
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Abstract 
 
This paper uses the error correcting methodology to investigate how pegged and non-pegged 
exchange rate regimes in a set of Caribbean countries affect the closeness of the relationship 
between changes in a base country rate and the local rate. This interest rate parity condition is 
subjected to effects arising from capital controls and common shocks related to inflation and 
external debt.  The results support the standard theory that peg countries (like Barbados) follow 
the base country interest rate more closely than the managed float or flexible rate economies 
(such as Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica). In addition, the paper supports the open economy 
macroeconomic policy trilemma proposition that only two of the following goals – stability in 
the exchange rate, national independence in monetary policy and free capital mobility- can be 
achieved simultaneously. 
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Introduction 
 
The trilemma or impossibility trinity of open economy macroeconomic policy, which refers to 
the situation that any two of the following goals – stability in the exchange rate, national 
independence in monetary policy and free capital mobility- can be achieved simultaneously, is a 
convenient way to categorise the choices that different economies make.  Most developing 
countries in the pre- late 1970s and a minor set today, which includes economies like China, 
India and Barbados, maintained exchange controls and limited private capital movements.  As a 
result, some of these countries pegged their exchange rates for extended periods, producing 
exchange rate stability, while others adjusted their currencies on occasion, offering considerable 
monetary autonomy. The main problem with this choice is that it imposes onerous restrictions on 
international transactions, reducing efficiency and contributing to corruption (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2006). 
 
Consequently, in the last two decades or so capital mobility has increased substantially, largely 
because of the removal of capital controls and improvement in communications technology. The 
expansion in capital mobility, in turn, has made adjustable peg regimes very vulnerable to 
speculation, since capital would flee in anticipation of devaluation. Consequently, developing 
countries have moved either towards a rigidly fixed exchange rate and a renunciation of 
monetary autonomy as seen in those countries that have dollarised or adopted currency boards, 
or towards flexibly managed (or even floating) exchange rates. However, there are problems 
with these two extreme positions. A rigid system like the currency board can deprive a country 
of much needed flexibility, especially when dealing with financial crises where the central bank 
is lender of last resort.  With respect to the fluctuating currency, developing countries often find 
the costs of such volatility hard to sustain because of the very open nature of their economies and 
because they are unable to borrow in their own currency, that is, they suffer from what is termed 
the original sin (see Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). Thus, countries claiming to “float” their 
currencies may display a “fear of floating” and instead limit currency fluctuations over long 
periods (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
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The above discussion suggests that the choice of the exchange rate regime is fundamental to the 
performance of an economy and this decision helps to determine the monetary policy options 
or/and the ability to maintain open capital markets. This paper provides empirical evidence on 
these issues in a diverse set of Caribbean countries. In essence, the article looks at the impact that 
fixing the exchange rate has on monetary policy, measured by a short-term interest rate, by 
establishing the extent to which interest rates in pegged countries (Barbados and the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States) follow base country interest rates and how they differ 
from economies that do not have fixed exchange rates (Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and 
Tobago). Following the trilemma result that, for instance, economies with a fixed exchange rate 
and open capital market increase the responsiveness of monetary policy (the base interest rate), 
the effect of capital controls on the relationship between interest rate behaviour of pegged and 
non-pegged countries is investigated.   
 
After this introduction, this study continues with a section on the theory of exchange rate regimes 
and monetary autonomy. Then, the empirical framework is discussed followed by a review of the 
empirical literature.  Next, the data, methodology and results are presented.  The final section 
deals with the concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Theory  
 
The uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition can be utilised to explain the impact of 
exchange rate regimes on monetary independence.  Consider the following UIP expression (in 
changes) when capital markets are open: 
 
∆Rt = ∆Rbt + ∆Et (et+1 – et) + ∆p                                                                             (1)                                                 
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where ∆ is the first difference operator, R is the domestic nominal interest rate, Rb is the base 
country nominal interest rate, E is the expectation operator, e is the exchange rate, p is the 
difference in risk of the two assets (risk premium) and t is the time index.  
 
In a fixed exchange rate system, since et is constant, the third term in Equation (1) becomes 
∆Etet+1.  Thus assuming p is very small or does not fluctuate with the change in interest rates and 
the expected future exchange rate remain the same, the local rate moves one on one with the base 
rate change, that is, 
 
∆Rt = ∆Rbt                                    (2)  
 
However, this one on one correspondence is violated whenever there is a fluctuation in the 
expected future exchange rate or the risk premium. For instance, an increase in the base rate 
could cause investors to doubt the stability of the peg or alternatively a fall in the base rate in 
times of global uncertainty could lead to a negative correlation between ∆Rbt and ∆Et (et+1 – et) + 
∆p (see Shambaugh, 2004).  
 
In the situation where the exchange rate is not pegged precisely but allowed to float within small 
bands, Svenssson (1994) shows that the degree to which the domestic rate follows the base rate 
is reduced since ∆Et (et+1 – et) ≠ 0 even if the peg is credible. As et can now change, long term 
monetary autonomy is lost, as the country must introduce policies to keep the parity credible.  
However, in the short term, the movement of et  provides the pegged country with some latitude.  
For example, if the base rate rises, the country could depreciate the currency, leading to an 
expected appreciation of the currency in the future. This negative correlation between ∆Rbt and 
∆Et et+1will weaken the one on one relation between ∆Rt and ∆Rbt.  
 
Under a floating exchange rate regime, the domestic interest rate does not have to respond to 
changes in the base interest rate or the expected exchange rate or for that matter, the risk 
premium. Instead, what is required is for the spot exchange rate to adjust in such a way that the 
expected change in the exchange rate is equal to the interest differential. In essence, the local rate 
can be set, and other factors can adjust to it.  However, as Shambaugh (2004) points out there 
may be other reasons why the base and local rates could be highly correlated in this framework.  
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For example, they may share similar shocks or the country involved could have a “fear of 
floating” in the sense of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in which local rates move with base rates to 
reduce exchange rate volatility. 
 
The above theoretical results suggest that non-pegged countries should have more monetary 
autonomy than economies with fixed exchange rates. However, an important caveat is that the 
findings rely on the assumption of free capital mobility.  If interest rates are set administratively 
or there are restrictions to international capital movements, there is no reason why ∆Rt =∆Rbt and 
hence, why pegged countries should lose monetary autonomy. This result follows directly from 
the open-economy trilemma policy framework mentioned above where if capital markets are 
closed the country can pursue domestically oriented monetary policy within a fixed exchange 
rate system.   
 
3.  Empirical Framework 
 
The empirical framework used to test the above theoretical results is based on the following 
equation 
 
, 0 1 , 2 3 , 4 5 ,
6 7
* * *
*
d t b t t b t t t b t t
t t t
R R float R float CapLib R CapLib
ED B
     
  
     
  
                       (3) 
 
where 
,d t
R is the domestic country interest rate, 
,B t
R is the base country interest rate, 
t
float is a 
dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 during the periods of a floating exchange rate 
regime, hence in the case of a country like Barbados that has maintained a fixed exchange rate 
throughout the sample period, this variable is omitted, 
t
CapLib is a measure of capital account 
liberalisation, 
t
ED is the external debt to GDP ratio, and 
t
 is the inflation rate. In this setup 
1
 reflects the conditional effects of the base country interest rate on the domestic interest. In 
other words, it is the influence of the base country interest rate on the domestic interest under the 
fixed exchange rate regime and full capital controls. 
3
 represents an interaction effect in that it 
estimates the extent to which moving to a floating exchange rate regime changes the 
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responsiveness of the domestic interest rate to changes in the base country interest rate. β5 is also 
an interaction term and captures the extent to which a more open capital account changes the 
responsiveness of the domestic interest rate to movements in the base country interest rate. ε is 
an error term assumed to satisfy the classical properties of least squares estimation.  
 
Since the theory suggests that non-pegged countries should have more monetary autonomy than 
pegged economies, ceteris paribus, it is expected that the size of β1 for pegged countries should 
be significantly larger than for non-pegged economies. In the extreme case where the peg is rigid 
(no bands) and perfectly credible, capital markets are open and arbitrage costless, risk premiums 
constant, and investors are optimizing, β1 should be 1.  For non-pegs, the theory suggests a much 
lower β1 driven by the correlation of shocks although, in the case of the fear of floating argument 
it is likely that the magnitude of β1 could approximate that of the pegged rate economies.  
 
These hypotheses regarding the size of β1 are conditioned by the behaviour of the control 
variables that measure the effect of capital mobility, external debt and inflation.  It is expected 
that the sign on the capital mobility variable will be positive while those on external debt and 
inflation are ambiguous (see Shambaugh, 2004). 
 
4.   A Brief Review of the Empirical Literature 
 
This section reviews some of the empirical studies concerned about the level of monetary 
independence exercised by economies characterised by different exchange rate regimes – fixed, 
floating or somewhere in between. Shambaugh (2004) conducted such a study on over 100 
developing and industrial countries from 1973 to 2000 using panel data analysis and the time 
series co-integration technique developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001).   The author also 
tested the theory of the open economy trilemma by adding capital controls as one of the 
explanatory variables in the regression. The empirical findings of the paper showed that pegged 
economies lack monetary freedom as local rates follow closely changes in the base country‟s 
interest rates while in non-pegged economies local rates revealed a less high association to 
movements in the interest rates of the base economy.  When capital mobility is incorporated into 
the analysis, Shambaugh (2004) found that non-pegs without capital controls display a fear of 
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floating or have a significant amount of common shocks as evidenced by the significant 
proportion of the changes in domestic interest rate that are explained by the international rate. 
The response of an economy with a fixed exchange rate and open capital market to changes in 
the foreign interest rate is large, resulting in a faster speed of adjustment to shocks than non-
pegged economies.   Pegs with capital controls show a much stronger relationship with the base 
interest rates than the non-pegs.  
 
Forssback and Oxelheim (2005) examined the relationship between monetary policy autonomy 
and different exchange-rate regimes in the small open European economies during the periods of 
the 1980s and 1990s.  The authors used Generalised Least Squares on a model determination 
procedure based on the Granger concept of causality. They found that the exchange rate regime 
of any country is not a good predictor of policy autonomy.  Results further indicated that an 
economy is considered to have a monetary policy constraint when its independent nominal target 
does not deviate too much from the targets of the country with which it is financially integrated.  
The paper states that this outturn is equivalent to an economy that has an explicit exchange rate 
peg.  Moreover, the authors empirical findings showed that the level of monetary policy 
autonomy enjoyed by the European economies have little variances regardless of the exchange 
rate regime of the country, fixed or flexible.  However, in the short term a flexible exchange rate 
provides an economy with a greater margin of monetary freedom, which proves to be 
advantageous under asymmetric shocks to the real economy. . 
 
In investigating the conventional proposition that an economy with a floating exchange rate 
allows the central bank to maintain monetary independence, Borensztein, Zettelmeyer and 
Philippon (2001) focused on two types of shocks: (a) changes in the US dollar interest rates and 
(b) movements in the risk premia attached to emerging market international bonds.  The 
empirical analysis, which was conducted, using vector autoregressions and impulse response 
functions mainly, concentrated on Latin American and Asian economies in the early 1990s. The 
authors found that the conventional proposition about exchange rate regimes with regard to the 
two types of shocks hold for both Hong Kong and Singapore.  Conversely, the impact of shocks 
to emerging market risk premia is about the same size of changes in the interest rates and 
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exchange rates in Argentina and more so, in Mexico.  However, these economies preserved 
monetary autonomy following an adjustment in the monetary stance of the US.   
 
Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2002) utilised simple linear regression to examine whether the 
choice of exchange rate regime affects the sensitivity of domestic interest rates to international 
interest rates using a large sample of developing and industrialised economies during the period 
1970 to 1990. The study also focused on the ability of a country with a floating exchange rate to 
isolate its domestic interest rate from negative international shocks.  The main results of the 
paper are summarized as follows.  First, all exchange rate regimes exhibit a high level of 
correlation between domestic interest rates and international interest rates, which are eventually 
fully transmitted in the long run.  Second, floating exchange rate regimes have a higher level of 
monetary independence or there have a certain degree of temporary monetary independence, in 
the sense that the speed of adjustment of domestic interest rates to international interest rates are 
lower under floating regimes than under any other type of regime.  Finally, the results show that 
only two industrialised countries, Germany and Japan, benefit from independent monetary policy 
in the 1990s, given that no evidence was found of a long-run relation between local and 
international interest rates. 
 
In a related paper, Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault (2002) employed the Generalised Methods of 
Moments estimator to investigate the influence of exchange rate regimes on economic growth 
using a panel of sixty industrialised and developing countries over the period 1973 to 1988. The 
evidence showed that any exchange rate regime characterised by a strong monetary policy 
framework have a positive influence on growth.  However intermediate or flexible exchange rate 
regimes without a monetary policy anchor are harmful to growth.  The study concludes that it is 
the presence of a strong monetary framework, rather than the type of exchange rate regime, that 
is important for economic growth. 
 
5.  Data, Methodology and Empirical Results 
5.1 Data 
The domestic country interest rate is the nominal rate on the respective Caribbean countries 
three-month treasury bills, while the base country interest rate is the nominal rate on the US 
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three-month treasury bills. For external debt, the stock of both private and public external debt to 
gross domestic product at market prices is employed.  The inflation rate, defined as 
ln(1 )CPI , represents changes in the consumer price index (CPI).  CapLib is taken from 
Greenidge (2006). The index is based on information taken from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)‟s annual publication on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER).  This publication contains detailed reports on each member country‟s exchange 
arrangement, administration of controls, prescription of currency, regulations on import and 
import payments etc. Greenidge (2006) also utilises additional information from the respective 
central banks.  He argues that the IMF‟s AREAER is updated annually and in many cases such 
information is only sent in summary, but there is usually more details and explanations housed 
within each of the Central Banks.  Therefore, he believes that the index is likely to provide a 
better reflection of the practices throughout the Caribbean region. All data, with the exception of 
Caplib are taken from the World Development Database 2007 and spans the period 1960 to 
2005. The data is expressed in natural logarithm and all computations are done in the PCGIVE 
econometric software programe. 
 
5.2  Methodology 
Plots of the data for the 3 Caribbean countries (see Figures 1 to 3), and confirmed by the unit 
root tests described below, suggest that the variables are a mixture of I(0) and I(1) processes.  
Hence, the Unrestricted Error Correcting Model (UECM) first introduced by Sargan (1964), and 
later popularised by Engle and Granger (1987), is used to estimate Equation (3) since it is still an 
open debate on how to appropriately handle combinations of stationary and non-stationary 
variables in standard co-integration frameworks like that of Johansen (1988). For a discussion of 
this debate see, for example, Greenidge (2006).  In addition, Monte Carlo studies have shown 
that the ECM procedure is as good as, if not more appropriate than, other co-integration 
techniques in dealing with small data samples, even in the presence of I(1) variables (see 
Krolzig, 2000).  With the ECM approach one can minimise the possibility of estimating spurious 
relations while retaining long-run information and at the same time derive a model that is 
suitable for economic interpretation. The final parsimonious ECM is computed with the help of 
the general-to-specific approach of Campos et al (2005) where an unrestricted model with 2 lags 
(2 lags are considered appropriate when dealing with annual data) is progressively reduce by 
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eliminating statistically insignificant coefficients and ensuring that no significant information is 
lost in the process as indicated by the diagnostic statistics at each stage.  
 
 
Figure1: Barbados Data 
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Figure 2: Trinidad and Tobago 
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Figure 3: Jamaica Data 
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5.3  Results 
Three tests for unit roots are undertaken in this paper: the Augmented Dickey - Fuller (ADF), 
Philips and Perron (PP) and the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS).  Except for 
the domestic interest rate of Barbados, these statistics are in agreement with each other and 
indicate that the interest rates are I(0) while external debt and prices are I(1).  With respect to the 
Barbados‟ local interest rate, there is an inconsistency in the findings of the ADF and PP tests 
verses that from the statistic of KPSS.  The former two tests indicate that R is I(1) while the latter 
statistic suggests it is I(0).  Figure 1 shows that this inconsistency could be explain by the break 
in the series in 2004. To deal with this, the procedure in Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2002) and 
Lanne et al. (2002) is utilised which involves adding a shift function to the ADF regression, then 
estimating the deterministic term by generalised least squares under the unit root null hypothesis, 
subtracting the resultant fit from the original series, and applying an ADF type test to the 
adjusted series that also includes terms to correct for estimation errors in the parameters of the 
deterministic part. The critical values for the new ADF statistic are given in Lanne et al. (2002). 
For more details on the specification of the various shift functions see Saikkonen and Lütkepohl, 
(2000; 2002). The included shift function is significant with a t-statistic of 9.378, while the test 
statistic for the null hypothesis of a unit root with this function incorporated is -3.308, which is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, it is assumed that R is I(0) for Barbados. 
 
Given that the variables are a mixture of I(0) and I(1) variables an UECM is estimated with two 
lags for the 3 countries.  A few issues relating to Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago need to be 
discussed before the results are presented.  The samples of both countries cover periods where 
the exchange rate was fixed and when it was un-pegged. This difference is shown clearly in 
Figures 2 and 3 where it is observed that the local rates diverge significantly from the foreign 
rate in the early 1980s for both countries.  To compound the situation the capital mobility 
variable of Greenidge (2006) used in this paper has an element of this exchange rate switch built 
into it.  As a result the model tries to account for these effects by attempting to disentangle the 
exchange rate regime impact on β1 from that related to capital liberalisation.  This is done 
through the interaction terms 
3
 and β5 mentioned above.  The final parsimonious representations 
of the models are presented in Tables 2 to 4 below along with some standard diagnostic statistics 
and long-run elasticities. 
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The models appear to be fairly well specified satisfying all the standard diagnostic checks. The 
estimated long-run parameter of β1 support the theory discussed above, that is, β1 is much higher 
for the fixed exchange rate economy of Barbados than the non-pegged economies of Trinidad 
and Tobago and Jamaica. This finding imply that the lost of monetary autonomy in Barbados is 
higher than in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  Using the same reasoning one would expect 
that   β1 to be larger for the manage float economy of Trinidad and Tobago than for the flexible 
rate regime of Jamaica.  This is borne out by the data where it is seen that the long run parameter 
coefficient for Jamaica could range between 0.07 and 0.48 relative to Trinidad and Tobago value 
of 0.59.  The short-run results are also in agreement with these long run findings, with the base 
rate impact in Barbados being 0.88, Trinidad and Tobago, 0.24, and Jamaica influence is not 
significant and dropped out in the general to specific reduction process.   
 
Turning now to the impact of capital mobility, it appears that in the long run, capital 
liberalisation only affects the local rate in Trinidad and Tobago and the result suggest that a 
change in capital liberalisation causes local rates to move in the same direction.  The 
insignificant finding for Barbados is as expected since that country during the sample period 
used here still had controls on private capital flows.  On the other hand Jamaica result is a bit 
surprising, especially since it has a significant positive short run effect but it may be explained 
by Jamaica‟s history of implementing and then reversing the capital liberalisation measures as 
well as Jamaica‟s bad timing of introducing capital liberalisation policies in an unfavourable 
macroeconomic environment (see Greenidge and Belford, 2000).  If anything, these sequences of 
decisions created greater uncertainty in the macroeconomy.  In fact, the statistically significant 
effect of the shock variables related to external debt and prices in the Jamaica equation may give 
credence to this view. Note the external debt variable is also found to be statistically significant 
in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago but with a negative sign. 
 
As far as the speed of adjustment is concerned Jamaica rate is the highest with 59% adjustment 
undertaken within in one year, compared to Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago whose 
adjustment rate is about 50% and 20%, respectively. The result for Jamaica is surprising since 
one would expect the interest rate in a non-pegged country to react less quickly to changes in 
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base rate than those of pegged economies. This result may reflect the greater uncertainty that 
existed in the Jamaican economy over the review period. 
 
Table 1: Results of Test for Stationarity 
 
 Barbados Trinidad Jamaica USA 
R 
Level 
-2.586 
[-2.702*] 
{0.319} 
 
-1.267 
[-1.511] 
{0.336}
+
 
-1.264 
[-1.454] 
{0.734}
++
 
-1.619 
[-1.975] 
{0.257} 
Δ 
-5.485*** 
[-6.085]*** 
{0.128} 
-5.873*** 
[-
5.917]*** 
{0.135} 
-9.721*** 
[-9.603]*** 
{0.238} 
-6.591*** 
[-3.806]*** 
{0.192} 
ED 
Level 
-2.868* 
[-4.773]** 
{0.667}
++
 
-2.235 
[-2.107] 
{0.597}
++
 
-1.055 
[-0.981] 
{0.696}
++
 
 
Δ 
-2.653* 
[-2.607] 
{0.545}
++
 
-3.676** 
[-
3.760]*** 
{0.219} 
-4.949*** 
[-5.168]*** 
{0.110}  
Notes: the first row for each country gives the ADF test statistic, the second 
row contains the PP test statistic in square brackets, and the third row shows 
the KPSS test statistic in curly brackets. *, **  and  ***  are the MacKinnon 
critical values for rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively, for both the ADF and PP tests, while  
+
, 
++
, 
+++
 are the critical values for the LM test statistic of the KPSS test and denote 
rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarity at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively (based upon the asymptotic results presented in KPSS (1992) 
Table 1, pp. 166).   Δ denotes the first difference of the original series. 
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Table 2: Results for Barbados 
 
ΔRB,t=       0.281   -  0.496*RB,t-1   +   0.8763*ΔRUS,t    +   0.435*RUS,t-1   -   2.227* ΔEDB,t 
               (0.182
++
)    (0.14
+++
)              (0.187
+++
)                 (0.126
+++
)             (0.879
++
)    
 
R
2
 = 0.67;  JOINT - F(4,29) = 9.921 [0.000];  DW =1.87; AR- F(2,27)  = 0.024 [0.976];  
ARCH- F(1,27)  = 0.413 [0.526];  Norm. -χ2(2) = 0.776 [0.679]; HET- F(8,20)  =   1.148 
[0.148];  RESET - F(1,28)  =  1.7454 [0.198]; 
 
Long-run elasticities (Long-run response of the domestic rate with respect to): 
Base Interest Rate    0.876 
External Debt/GDP    none 
Capital Account Liberalisation   none 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
+
, 
++
 
and 
+++
 denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The F-statistic for the 
respective diagnostics tests are shown and the associated p-value in square brackets. R
2
 is the 
fraction of the variance of the dependent variable explained by the model and JOINT is a test of 
the joint significance of the explanatory variables, DW is the Durbin Watson statistic, AR is the 
Lagrange multiplier test for p-th order residual autocorrelation correlation, RESET = Ramsey test 
for functional form mis-specification (square terms only); Norm is the test for normality of the 
residuals based on the Jarque-Bera test statistic (χ2 (2)). ARCH is the autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity for up to p-th order (see Engle, 1982a). HET is the unconditional 
heteroscedasticity test based on the regression of squared residuals on the squared fitted values. 
Finally, Chow (n) is Chow‟s (1960) test for parameter constancy based on breakpoints in the 
sample (two breakpoints are tested - the sample mid-point and 90th percentile). 
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Table 3: Results for Trinidad and Tobago 
 
ΔRTT,t =   -2.272 -       0.204*RTT,t-1 + 0.12*RUS,t-1 + 0.238*ΔRUS,t-1  + 0.138* CLTT,t-1 - 
0.438*ΔEDTT,t-1  
               (0.918
+++
)    (0.115
++
)          (0.067
++
)          (0.087
++
)             (0.055
+++
)             
(0.174
+++
)        
 
                  – 1.002*dumfloatt-1 
                    (0.385
+++
)   
 
R
2
 = 0.65;  JOINT - F(6,26) = 7.148 [0.000];  DW =2.20; AR- F(2,25)  =  0.462 [0.635];  
ARCH- F(1,25)  =  0.471 [0.499];  Norm. -χ2(2) = 0.175 [0.916]; HET- F(11,15) =  0.893 
[0.567];  RESET - F(1,26)  =   2.268 [0.144]; 
 
Long-run elasticities (Long-run response of the domestic rate with respect to): 
Base Interest Rate    0.590 
External Debt/GDP    non3 
Inflation     none 
Capital Account Liberalisation   0.675 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
+
, 
++
 
and 
+++
 denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The F-statistic for the 
respective diagnostics tests are shown and the associated p-value in square brackets. R
2
 is the 
fraction of the variance of the dependent variable explained by the model and JOINT is a test of 
the joint significance of the explanatory variables, DW is the Durbin Watson statistic, AR is the 
Lagrange multiplier test for p-th order residual autocorrelation correlation, RESET = Ramsey test 
for functional form mis-specification (square terms only); Norm is the test for normality of the 
residuals based on the Jarque-Bera test statistic (χ2 (2)). ARCH is the autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity for up to p-th order (see Engle, 1982a). HET is the unconditional 
heteroscedasticity test based on the regression of squared residuals on the squared fitted values. 
Finally, Chow (n) is Chow‟s (1960) test for parameter constancy based on breakpoints in the 
sample (two breakpoints are tested - the sample mid-point and 90th percentile). 
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Table 4: Results for Jamaica 
 
ΔRJ,t = 1.515 -     0.588*RJ,t-1 + 0.042*RUS,t-1 + 0.243*(RUS,t-1*floatJ,t-1)  + 0.679*ΔEDJ,t + 
0.282*EDJ,t-1 
          (0.568
+++
)  (0.092
+++
)      (0.035
+
)             (0.039
+++
)                          (0.186
+++
)          
(0.082
+++
) 
 
+ 0.310*ΔCLJ,t-1  + 0.234*πJ,t-1 + 0.196*ΔπJ,t - 0.123*ΔπJ,t-1 + 0.744*dum2003 
(0.197
+++
)              (0.031
+++
)         (0.026
+++
)      (0.020
+++
)         (0.109
+++
)            
 
R
2
 = 0.82;  JOINT - F(10,23) = 18.91 [0.000];  DW =2.61; AR- F(2,21)  = 1.747 [0.199]  
ARCH- F(1,21)  =  0.146 [0.706];  Norm. -χ2(2) = 0.848 [0.655]; HET- F(16,6)  =  0.447 
[0.907];  RESET - F(1,22)  =  1.084 [0.309]; 
 
Long-run elasticities (Long-run response of the domestic rate with respect to): 
Base Interest Rate    J0.243*float0.042  + 0.071 + 0.413*float
0.588 0.588
  
External Debt/GDP    0.481 
Inflation     0.413 
Capital Account Liberalisation   none 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
+
, 
++
 and 
+++
 denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
The F-statistic for the respective diagnostics tests are shown and the associated p-value in 
square brackets. R
2
 is the fraction of the variance of the dependent variable explained by 
the model and JOINT is a test of the joint significance of the explanatory variables, DW is 
the Durbin Watson statistic, AR is the Lagrange multiplier test for p-th order residual 
autocorrelation correlation, RESET = Ramsey test for functional form mis-specification 
(square terms only); Norm is the test for normality of the residuals based on the Jarque-
Bera test statistic (χ2 (2)). ARCH is the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity for 
up to p-th order (see Engle, 1982a). HET is the unconditional heteroscedasticity test 
based on the regression of squared residuals on the squared fitted values. Finally, Chow 
(n) is Chow‟s (1960) test for parameter constancy based on breakpoints in the sample 
(two breakpoints are tested - the sample mid-point and 90th percentile). 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper takes up the issue of how an exchange rate regime affects monetary policy, 
empirically evaluating it in the context of Caribbean countries.  In particular, the fixed 
exchange rate economy of Barbados is contrasted with the managed float of Trinidad and 
Tobago and the flexible rate of Jamaica in the context of an uncovered interest rate parity 
equation extended to include the impact of capital controls and shocks related to external 
debt and inflation. The main result is that monetary policy in the fixed rate country 
follows more closely that of the base country than in the “floaters”, suggesting that the 
open-economy tilemma framework is an adequate characterisation of policy analysis in 
these countries; fixed rates involve a loss of monetary policy autonomy. 
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